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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM HUCKINS,

:

Petitioner/Appellee
v.

:

Appellate Case No. 20080108-CA
NANNETTE ROLFE, Bureau Chief Driver :
Control Bureau, Driver License Division,
Department of Public Safety, State of Utah :
Respondent /Appellant. :

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS
William Huckins, was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (DUI) by a
Salt Lake City Police Officer in Salt Lake City, Utah, on July 18, 2007.
Subsequent to his arrest he was asked to submit to a breath test which he refused.
Following his arrest, Mr. Huckins filed a request for administrative hearing
pursuant to U.C.A. 53-3-223. A hearing was held before the Driver License
Division (DLD) on August 14, 2007. Following the hearing the DLD issued an
order suspending Mr. Huckins' driver license for a period of 18 months based on
his alleged refusal to submit to a chemical test at the time of his arrest. Mr.
Huckins then filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Third District Court. The
Petitioner's Petition came before the Third District Court, Judge Lindberg, for a
Trial de Novo on December 10, 2007. At the Trial de Novo, the Petitioner made
1

an oral motion asking the Court to Order the DLD to immediately reinstate his
drivers license pursuant to U.C.A. § 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii). Judge Lindberg granted
the Petitioner's motion and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on January 2, 2008, ordering the Respondent DLD to immediately reinstate
the Petitioner's drivers license. The Respondent then filed this appeal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
It is the position of the Defendant that pursuant to U.C.A. § 53-3-223 he is
entitled to an immediate reinstatement of his driving privileges based on the
dismissal of the criminal charges against him for DUI which stemmed from the
same arrest and facts for which his license was and remains suspended by the
Drivers License Division. As such, the Division's failure to reinstate his driving
privileges is a "wrongful use of judicial authority" as set forth in Rule 65B(d) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and he is entitled to relief in the form of an
Order requiring the Division to immediately reinstate his driving privileges.

ARGUMENT
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In oruoi lu determine the meaning of U.C.A. ? 53-3-223. we first look to
the language of the statute ana appi> a plain meann.. ,. ;»..
therein.
"Under our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the
• statute's plain language to determine its meaning." Mountain Ranch
Estates v. State Tax Comm'n, 2004 UT 86, «f 9, 100 P.3d 1206. This
court presumes "that the terms of a statute are used advisedly" by the
legislature. Bd. ofEduc. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035
(Utah 1983). "Therefore, effect should be given to each such word,
phrase, clause, and sentence where reasonably possible." Chris &
Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm% 791 P.2d 511.516
(Utah 1990)
Sindtv. Ret. Bd,, JUU/ i i 10. \ o. i^ / i\Ai_?j
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"Under our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the
statute's plain language to determine its meaning." Sindtv. Ret. Bd.,
2007 UT 16, If 8, 157 P.3d 797 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"We read the plain language of a statute ... as a whole and interpret
its provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute."
Sill v. Hart 2007 UT 45, ^T 7. 162 P.3d 1099 (internal quotation
marks omitted). "We do so because a statute is passed as a whole
and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose
and intent." Id.
State v. Gallegos, 171 P.3d 426 (Utah 2007).
We assume that the legislature used the different terms advisedly
and we enforce them as plainly set forth in the statute. See, e.g., In re
Z.C.. 2007 UT 54, % 6, 165 P.3d 1206 (" 'When examining the
statutory language we assume the legislature used each term
advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning.' " (quoting
State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80,1 8, 52 P.3d 1276)); Martinez v.
Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
2007 UT 42, If 46, 164P.3d384 (same).
State v.Johnson, 2007 UT App 392, 2007 WL 4336314.
A plain language reading of this statute and in consideration of the
entire statute supports the Petitioner's position that the immediate
reinstatement provision is applicable to all suspensions or revocations. The
clear language of U.C.A. § 53-3-223, does not specifically state that the
immediate reinstatement provision is applicable only to 90 day suspensions.
Likewise, the statute does not specifically state that immediate
reinstatement is specifically prohibited in certain types or lengths of
suspensions or revocations. It simply states that "The division shall
immediately reinstate a person's license upon receiving written verification
of the person's dismissal of a charge for a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or
4

41-6a-517." The statute, simply put, indicates that upon showing proof of a
dismissal of the criminal charge of DUI the driver's license should be
immediately reinstated.
The trial court in this case found that the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office
decision not to file a formal DUI charge against the Petitioner and his plea to the
remaining traffic violations was the functional equivalent of a "dismissal" as the
term is used in U.C.A. § 53-3-223. Thus, under the clear and plain language of the
statute the Petitioner was entitled to the immediate reinstatement of his driver
license based on the "dismissal" of the criminal charge of DUI by
the Salt Lake City Prosecutor.
Although neither the Utah Court of Appeals nor the Utah Supreme Court
have had the opportunity to rule in any case interpreting the new language
contained in U.C.A. § 53-3-223 as the statute was just recently passed and made
effective in May of 2007, the trial court rendered a fair and reasonable
interpretation of this language in ruling in favor of the Petitioner and ordering the
immediate reinstatement of his driver license.
At the time of the Trial de Novo before Judge Lindberg and in its Brief, the
DLD argued that the language of U.C.A. § 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii) applied only to 90
day suspensions imposed by the DLD and not to an 18 month refusal suspension
like the one imposed on the Petitioner. In its opening brief the Appellant DLD
argues that "the district court interpreted this subsection out of context with the
remaining parts of Section 53-3-223" (See Brief of Respondent pg. 7) but seems to
5

ignore the fact that several portions of U.C.A. § 53-3-223 either deal specifically
with "refusal" to submit to a chemical test or are applied equally to both 90 day
suspensions and refusal suspensions.
Although Utah's Implied Consent law can be found in U.C.A. § 41-6a-520,
whether the driver submitted to a chemical test or whether he refused the chemical
test, the request for an administrative hearing is always made pursuant to U.C.A. §
53-3-223 (6)(a).
(6) (a) Upon request in a manner specified by the division, the
division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within
29 days after the date of arrest. The request to be heard shall be
made within ten calendar days of the day on which notice is
provided under Subsection (5).
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 53-3-223, following a request for an administrative hearing
submitted by the driver within 10 days pursuant to U.C.A. § 53-3-223(6)(a) the
Driver License Division shall hold a hearing and:
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the
person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a502or41-6a-517;
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test, and
(iii) the test results, if any.
U.C.A. § 53-3-223 (emphasis added)
As such, it is clear that many portions of U.C.A.§ 53-3-223 are applied to
both 90 day suspensions as well as refusal suspensions therefore an interpretation
that the immediate reinstatement provision of U.C.A. § 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii) applies
to refusal suspensions in the absence of language specifically limiting it to 90 days
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suspensions would not be inconsistent with the remainder of U.C.A. § 53-3-223
because many of the provisions apply to all suspensions. Appellant argues that
such an interpretation would be "nonsensical or absurd." What does not make
sense is that if the legislature specifically intended the immediate reinstatement
provision to apply only to 90 days suspension why did the legislature not
specifically state that the immediate reinstatement provision of U.C.A. § 53-3223(7)(b)(ii) applied solely to 90 day suspensions. Rather the prior version of
U.C.A. § 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii) which was in effect at the time of the Petitioner's
Trial de Novo contained no such language restricting the application of the
immediate reinstatement provision to 90 day suspensions.

B.

THE CHANGES IN THE STATUTE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY IN THIS CASE AS THEY DO NOT SIMPLY
CLARIFY THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE BUT SIGNIFICANTLY
ALTER THE STATUTE IN A WAY THAT WOULD "DEPRIVE A
PARTY [PETITIONER! OF HIS RIGHTS" TO HAVE HIS LICENSE
IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED BASED ON THE DISMISSAL OF THE
DUI CHARGE AGAINST HIM.

Following the ruling by Judge Lindberg and in direct response to Judge
Lindberg's interpretation of U.C.A. § 53-3-223, representatives from the Driver
License Division conferred with members of the legislature to propose changes to
the language of U.C.A. § 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii) to limit the immediate reinstatement
provisions to 90 day suspensions. In response, during the last legislative sessions
changes were made to U.C.A. § 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii) as set forth in the Respondent's
7

brief.
The DLD argues that the changes made by the Utah Legislature to U.C.A. §
53-3-223 and the provision in question here serves to clarify the legislature's
original intent as to the application of the immediate reinstatement provision. The
DLD further argues that it should be applied retroactively in this case to interpret
the language of U.C.A. § 53-3-223 (7)(b)(ii) as it was written at the time of the
Petitioner's Trial de Novo and which was interpreted by the trial court in the
Petitioner's favor. Mr. Huckins urges that the changes in the statute should not be
applied retroactively in this case as they do not simply clarify the meaning of the
statute but significantly alter the statute in a way that would "deprive a party
[Petitioner] of his rights" to have his license immediately reinstated based on the
dismissal of the DUI charge against him.
U.C.A. § 68-3-3 specifically states that "No part of these revised statutes is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." Although S.B. 15 indicates that it
"clarifies that certain license reinstatement provisions only apply to a certain 90
day suspension period imposed by the Driver License divisions", it make no
mention of a retroactive application of the alleged "clarification" of the immediate
reinstatement statute. The amended version of U.C.A. § 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii)
contains significant changes that completely alter the meaning of the previous
statute and go far beyond a simple clarification of the prior statute. As argued
above, a plain language interpretation of the previous version of U.C.A. § 53-3-223
(7)(b)(ii) clearly gives the Petitioner a right to have his license reinstated
8

immediately after showing proof of the dismissal of the DUI charge. The
Petitioner concedes that under the new version of U.C.A. § 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii), the
Petitioner would not be entitled to immediate reinstatement because the new
language of the statute, particularly U.C.A. § 53-3-223(7)(b)(iii) specifically limits
the reinstatement provisions to "only apply to a 90 day suspension period",
something that the previous version of the statute did not do.
As such, the new limitation to apply the immediate reinstatement
provisions only to 90 day suspensions set forth in the new version of U.C.A. § 533-223 is more than a clarification of the prior statute; and since it contains no
specific language indicating that it is to be applied retroactively, it must not be
applied retroactively in this case and deprive the Petitioner of his right to have his
license reinstated.

CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth above the Defendant respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the District Court's ruling that U.C.A.§ 53-3-223 (7)(b)(ii)
as previously written applies to all driver license suspension including refusal
suspensions and further uphold the District Court's order that the DLD
immediately reinstate the Petitioner's driver license.

ORAL ARGUMENT
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The Defendant\Appellant respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals set
this matter for oral argument upon the filing of all briefs by the parties.

DATED this 23rd day of June, 2008 .

Jpon Schatz
attorney for Defendant
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